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The American Nightmare: The Ford Edsel Flop and Sputnik Terror
With fears mounting that Communism would establish a foothold in the Americas,
American officials stood in horror as a communist-led attack on American tariffs in 1958
caused “US prestige [to become] extremely low [in Peru] lately.” Trying to calm the raging
storm, Vice President Richard Nixon travelled to Lima, Peru to clear up a “shocking
misunderstanding of United States policies.” Hoping to showcase “US prestige,” Nixon
decided to parade through the streets of Lima in the car of the future, the Ford Edsel.
Instead Nixon was greeted by “2,000 jeering, fist shaking youths and adults,” as Nixon’s
Edsel was pelted with “a Communist barrage of…stones, eggs, and oranges.”1 When
reporters asked about the incident later, a bruised and bloodied “Nixon joked ‘they were
throwing eggs at the car, not me.’”2
Ironically there was some truth to this joke, but the reason why would horrify the
Vice President. From the remote streets of Lima to the headquarters of America’s most
powerful media giants, it seemed everyone was pelting Ford Motor Company’s ill-fated
Edsel. What was supposed to be the car of the future and an emblem of American prestige
had turned into a symbol of America’s sharp decline. Two years earlier, Ford promised
consumers riding on the waves of economic good times that they would no longer have to
settle for their old entry-level Ford’s. Instead of allowing middle-class Ford customers to
defect to General Motor’s flashy medium-price brands that showed personality and
prestige, in 1957 Ford launched the Edsel as the perfect car for these “professional…
Tad Szulc, “Nixon is Stoned By Peru Rioters Headed By Reds,” New York Times, May 9,
1958: pg. 1.
2 James Barron, “After 50 years, the Edsel is no longer regarded as an ugly car but is
cherished by its (few) owners,” New York Times, August 7, 2007: A1.
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famil[ies].”3 Yet soon after the Edsel launched, the Soviet Union’s Sputnik satellite made the
good times come to a grinding halt. The triumphant America that Ford designed the Edsel
for ceased to exist once the Soviets seemingly conquered outer space, and the failed Edsel
only fueled America’s fears that they were slipping behind the Russians. Ultimately Ford
tried selling excess, American technological prowess, and the American Dream when the
Edsel and Sputnik were proof that all three were in jeopardy.
Despite defeating the Nazis and the Japanese Empire merely five years prior, by the
early 1950s America’s victory celebration had long since ended. With communism
spreading into China and the Soviets armed with nuclear weapons, the general public and
some in government began to fear that the Soviets would soon eclipse America as “the most
powerful nation in the world.”4 As if the overseas crisis was not enough, Americans feared
Communism was infecting and weakening the United States at home. Democracy itself
seemed under siege, as Senator Joe McCarthy warned the public that the State Department
were infested with “105 known Communists… [such as official] Alger Hiss.”5 In fact the
Soviets claimed they had “the positive loyalty of important…government officials!”6
Hollywood was under their thumb, with “Russian…families…with communism in their
blood” like the iconic Warner Brothers supposedly turning American film into Communist
propaganda.7 Worst of all, Americans “for the first time since 1815” no longer felt safe at
Thomas E. Bonsall, Disaster in Dearborn: The Story of the Edsel, (Stanford CA: Stanford
University Press, 2002) 110.
4 Andrea Carosso, Cold War Narratives: American culture in the 1950s, (Bern, Germany,
Peter Lang, 2012) 16.
5 Carosso, Cold War Narratives, 10.
6 Robert H. Zieger, "The evolving cold war: the changing character of the enemy within,
1949-63." American Communist History 3, no. 1 (June 2004): 3-23. America: History and Life
with Full Text, EBSCOhost (accessed November 29, 2016), 14.
7 Carosso, Cold War Narratives, 20.
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home.8 Stories of Soviet spies like the Rosenbergs made families wonder if the new
neighbors across the street were really agents in “an active Soviet spy network in the US,”
and schoolchildren practiced “duck and cover” under their desks because “a nuclear attack
could strike at any time without warning.”9 These dark events created a pervasive fear that
America was in dire straits.
Yet following President Eisenhower’s election in 1952, America seemed to be
emerging out of these dark times. McCarthyism began to fade, culminating in Senator
McCarthy’s censure from the Senate in 1954. The Soviet Union was somewhat less of a
threat, as “Stalin’s death [in 1953 allowed for] easing the Cold War” since his successor
Khrushchev seemed open to reform.10 World War III seemed less imminent, as
Eisenhower’s “New Look” foreign policy cut runaway defense spending that was “draining
[America’s] wealth and labor.” Instead of funding a conventional army prepared for
imminent war, Eisenhower transitioned American into “the long haul” by “relying on
enhanced nuclear forces” so powerful that Moscow would never dare directly challenge the
United States.11
As the foreign situation improved, the booming American economy became a vent
for citizens to showcase American prestige and became a part of the national identity. Now
the “heady 1920s seemed pale in comparison,” as Americans bragged of having “the highest
standard of living of any nation in the history of the world.” In fact, Life magazine went as
far to say that “depressions, [and] recessions” were things of the past. Throughout the
Zieger, Evolving Cold War, 15.
Carosso, Cold War Narratives, 29-30.
10 Zieger, Evolving Cold War, 13.
11 Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930’s, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1995) 192-195.
8
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decade, America’s gross national product exploded by 250%, transforming America into a
“consumer economy” with aims far beyond providing “simple human needs such as shelter,
food, and clothing.” American households became filled with new laundry machines, better
refrigerators, and nicer cars in the driveway. Most importantly, the economy became yet
another battleground for the Cold War. It now became the duty of the citizen to spend into
the economy to ensure “Capitalist plenty vs. Socialist penury,” as economic abundance and
“freedom… [seemed] interdependent.” Ultimately consumer spending became an American
way of life as important as democracy itself.12
At the pinnacle of this roaring economy, the American automobile industry’s
massive growth was a perfect showcase for America’s prestige. Now it too was a vent to
showcase American strength. Suddenly there were “more cars in the United States than the
rest of the world put together,” and America’s “Big Three” of Ford, General Motors, and
Chrysler controlled 99% of all sales.13 In fact, from pre-war 1941 to 1955 America went
from producing only 3,250,000 passenger cars annually to over eight million. Furthermore
cars had “more powerful engines... automatic transmissions… [and company’s now had to
focus on] style, comfort, and safety.”14
Above all else, there were now plenty of options besides old entry-level cars or
untouchable luxuries. In 1950, General Motors unleashed “absolute pandemonium” in the
industry by using the same body for all of their cars. While General Motors had “a body
interchangeability program” since the 1920s, the “1950… program… carried the concept to
unimaginable heights and left all of its competitors in the dust” by allowing all GM cars to
Corosso, Cold War Narratives, 39-52.
13 Corosso, Cold War Narratives, 53-54.
14 John Bell Rae, The American Automobile Industry, (Boston, Twayne Publishers, 1985)
161-187.
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have “the same basic body!” This was a gigantic cost saver, allowing General Motors to
invest money instead into differentiating their brands through ornamentation and
technology. All of these innovations strengthened General Motors’ longstanding ladder of
consumption, since General Motors could use their savings to augment their cars far more
than their competitors. This benefited their entry-level Chevrolet, their medium-priced
Pontiac, Buick, and Oldsmobile brands, and it allowed their luxury Cadillacs to create a “a
halo effect” for the rest of the company.15 The average American might not have been able
to afford a Cadillac, but its prestige brought attention to the company and its lower brands.
Additionally, companies increasingly began to advertise their cars as “ personal
expressions of the psyche of the owner.”16 The days of parking lots filled with identical
Model T’s were long gone, as advertisers sold cars that appealed to consumer’s deepest
subliminal desires like “sex, security, and prestige.” Now consumers were spending “a little
extra money for a little something exciting” after the dark days of the War, and they flocked
to General Motors’ “personal… [and] intimate” cars.17 It did not matter that the cars were
not mechanically different; instead automakers emphasized their cars’ personality. For
instance, General Motors crafted a prestigious image in a 1957 Cadillac advertisement to
attract upper-class buyers. General Motors’ advertisers surrounded the Cadillac with
glimmering jewels, with a sparkling Cadillac emblem serving as the crown jewel. GM
emphasized its “sheer beauty” and “majesty” throughout the page, creating a perfect image

Bonsall, Disaster in Dearborn, 63- 150.
Charles Goodrum, Advertising in America: The First Two Hundred Years, (New York, Harry
N Abrams, 1990) 341.
17 Juliann Sivulka, Sex, Soap, and Cigarettes: A Cultural History of American Advertising,
(Boston, Cengage Learning, 1997) 248-266.
15
16
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for Americans wanting to show their wealth. All of these efforts left no doubt that a Cadillac
“suggested a [luxurious] lifestyle.”18
Yet the personalized car was not unique to luxury; companies crafted personalized
images for their medium priced brands as well. For instance a Buick appealed to
“professionals and families,” and sports cars like the Corvette were “workhorses” and
“mistresses.”19 Suddenly America’s newfound citizen consumers flocked to these
personalized brands, as 60% of all car sales were medium priced.20 With much more
options than its competitors, General Motors stood tall as the undisputed champion of the
car industry.
Yet fast approaching on GM’s tail was the original American car company, Ford
Motor Company. After years of mismanagement and stubbornness to adapt to a market no
longer satisfied with entry-level cars, in 1945 Henry Ford II’s leadership brought what
Fortune magazine called the “rebirth of Ford.” Analytical “whiz kids” like Robert McNamara
and Ernest Breech joined the company to modernize its byzantine management structure
that once placed all power in the hands of Henry Ford and fix its “non-existent… financial
controls.” By the end of the Korean War, Ford surpassed Chrysler and became second only
to General Motors.21
Buoyed by their success, Henry Ford II began to have dreams of beating the hated
General Motors “car for car.” However by 1956, there were still serious issues holding Ford
Heon Stevenson, American Automobile Advertising, 1930-1980, (Jefferson, North Carolina,
McFarland and Company, 2008) 190.
19 Rae, American Automobile, 180.
Goodrum, Advertising Age, 241.
20 “The Edsel Story,” last modified July 9, 2010, https://archive.org/details/TheEdelStory.
21 Douglas Brinkley, Wheels for the World: Henry Ford, his Company, and a Century of
Progress, (London: Penguin Group, 2003) 524-529.
Bonsall, Disaster in Dearborn, 55.
18
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back. While the entry-level Ford competed with Chevrolet and the Thunderbird sports car
could “compete in image with Corvettes,” Ford’s medium priced options were seriously
lacking. General Motors had three brands to attract buyers, but Ford only had the Mercury
brand. Yet the “plain” Mercury did not appeal to many drivers, and Ford felt it was because
“it did not make them look any richer” than the entry-level did.22 When entry-level Ford
customers grew out of their price market, 74% defected to either Chrysler or General
Motors. Conversely General Motors kept 78% of their customers. However in 1956,
executive Lewis Crusoe had a solution. Starting in 1957, Ford Motor Company would offer
four car divisions, the entry-level Ford, the medium-priced Edsel and Mercury divisions,
and the luxury Lincoln.23
Thinking national prosperity would never end, Ford tailor-made the Edsel division
to fit “the younger executive or professional family on its way up” in a “growing America.”24
The Edsel would have “unexcelled leadership in its [price] field,” and it would be a
performing modern car that’s “uniqueness shall be a requisite.” Immediately Edsel
designers implemented these goals into the car, creating what Henry II saw as a car with
“graceful styling… but not too radical.”25 Instead of the typical horizontal grille, drivers
would immediately recognize an Edsel by its “strong and original… vertical grille.” “No
other American car” looked anything like it, only “high-grade cars being built in Europe”
did. In addition Ford filled the car with the latest technological gadgets, making it “the

Brinkley, Wheels for the World, 564-576.
23 “The Edsel Story.”
24 “The Edsel Story.”
25 “The Edsel Story.”
22
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epitome of the push-button era… without [over the top] Buck Rodgers concepts” ruining
things.26
With the Edsel designed, Ford readied it for a spectacular launch on September 4,
1957. After news of the Edsel leaked to industry magazine Motor Trend, Ford spent fifty
millions dollars on the most expensive marketing campaign in history. Executives went on
pyrotechnic-filled speaking tours; mysterious advertising littered magazines like Life; and
new dealerships sprouted throughout the country, all culminating in a launch show in
Dearborn filled with stunt drivers, car giveaways, and a special Edsel nightclub after party
for industry heads and the media. All of this was centered on three marketing goals,
emphasizing that it was a “smart car,” a car for “younger…professional…families,” and that
it was a symbol of the American Dream. When E-Day finally came, it seemed everyone
“wanted to know about the new Edsel.”27 Three million Americans filled Edsel dealerships,
and newspapers like the New York Times praised the car’s “mechanical innovations” and
“spectacular…difference in style” from other cars.28
As millions of excited Americans finally caught their first glimpses of the anticipated
Edsel, the Edsel’s family message fit perfectly into Cold War values. In the face of the atheist
and immoral Communist hordes, throughout the 1950s Americans stressed traditional
values such as religion and family. Much of this seeped into advertising, as advertisements
often “reinforced family values… idealized versions of Mom, Dad, Junior, and Sis.” For
instance, a new Frigidaire would make a housewife feel like the queen of the household, as
the ad glorified “the lady of the house.” Other ads showcase wives as “dedicated
Bonsall, Disaster in Dearborn, 85- 87
Bonsall, Disaster in Dearborn, 110-123.
28 Jodeph C. Ingraham, “Edsel offer Style Innovation,” New York Times, Aug 27, 1957, AI.
26
27
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homemakers… [who only wished to] pamper their husband,” and Coca-Cola
advertisements glorified sons playing baseball with their friends and daughters learning
how to sow from their mothers.29
With these ads in mind, the Edsel’s focus on All-American families fit perfectly in
this Cold War atmosphere.30 Throughout Ford’s ads they sought to emphasize “spirited but
responsible [young] adventurers,” even going as far as to create half an hour
advertisements of Edsel owners going on various trips. 31 Middle class families tuning into
their televisions watched ads such as What an Adventure, a story of a young family using
their Edsel to escape the monotony of New York City life and go fishing in Montauk, Long
Island. After catching a giant fish, the exuberant son exclaimed “what a swell Dad I’ve got”
as the family drove away in their Edsel. However Ford also targeted young couples on their
way up in society, as the West of the Tetons advertisement shows. Ford’s “spirited but
responsible adventurers” traveled through the mountainside in their Edsel, as the wife
praised her husband for being smart and “up to date with the latest gadgets.” In fact,
virtually every print Edsel ad showcased professional men dressed in suits with their
young families, leaving no doubt that this was their target market. 32
Yet a month to the day of E-Day, shocking news broke that the Soviet Union beat
America to outer space. Ironically the American government “never felt …we were in a race
with the Soviets” into space; in fact President Eisenhower and many scientists in the

“It’s pause time…mother” and “part of the game,” The Advertisement Archives, Ad#
30578104 and 30578112, 1950s collection.
30 Sivulka, American Advertising, 253-258.
31 Bonsall, Disaster in Dearborn, 110.
32“What a vacation” and “West of Tetons,” last modified July 7, 2010,
https://archive.org/details/Edsel-WhatAVacation.
29
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American missile program were far more concerned with “the public’s overreaction.”33 The
United States had their own satellite prepared for 1958, and Eisenhower saw no pressing
need to speed up the launch. Yet the American people sharply disagreed. Stunned
Americans watching NBC news coverage listened to Sputnik’s “eerie beep beep… beep from
somewhere out in space,” and in that moment Eisenhower’s “long haul” focused “New
Look” foreign policy collapsed.34 Now it seemed “an enemy attack… [by ICBM’s] could wipe
out…the entire nuclear deterrent” that had made war seem so unlikely, bringing the worst
of the Red Scare back to America. Extravagance came under fire, citizens doubted the
American Dream, and the old insidious fear that America was slipping behind returned.
Suddenly, the America Ford designed the Edsel for no longer existed. Instead the United
States was readying to face a new “Sputnik challenge,” and the Edsel’s marketing only
emphasized all that was wrong with the past.35
Perhaps the central focus of the Edsel campaign was that it represented the
American Dream. It was the car for all the young Americans “on their way up,” and Ford
now had “the E-car [that] has faith in you son, we’ll help you make it!”36 For this reason,
Ford stressed throughout their marketing that the Edsel was a prestige symbol. Looking at
Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993) xiv.
34 Since nuclear war theoretically ensured mutual destruction, President Eisenhower did
not think America could defeat the Soviets in a hot war. Instead Eisenhower prepped
America for a “decades long” cold and indirect battle with the Soviets, cutting spending for
conventional armed forces and increasing funding for a nuclear deterrent. This allowed
Eisenhower to balance budgets and invest in the economy, since the nuclear deterrent was
far cheaper than a massive conventional military. However once Sputnik launched, hawks
in government feared the Russians would be able to build Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
that would make American B-52 bomber planes obsolete. Suddenly Americans doubted if
the United States would win this long battle and instead argued for a more direct approach
with the Soviets. Now Eisenhower had to increase defense spending, destroying his “New
Look” policy. See, Sherry, Shadow of War, pages 192-195, 214-218.
35 Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 1-34.
36 Bonsall, Disaster in Dearborn, 110.
33
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the 1958 ad “They’ll know you’ve arrived when you drive up in an Edsel”, the American
Dream is the central focus. Claims that neighbors will envy “your Edsel” and will take
“another look” in awe litter the page, and the advertisement’s ideal family was proof that
Edsel owners have “arrived.” The family was everything an American man could hope to
have, with his new Post-War home, glistening Edsel, and his smiling wife and children
excited for him to come home from work.37
However with Sputnik patrolling the “Commie sky [sic],” Americans began to doubt
that this hopeful future was possible any longer. 38 Frustrated over Sputnik, Ford executives
bemoaned that “Americans suddenly began to question the validity of the American Dream
itself,” and to Ford’s horror they were right.39 News of Sputnik sent America into a massive
panic not seen since the early 1950s, as once again it seemed America would lose its fight
with the dreaded Soviet Union. Americans cowered as politicians like Senator Lyndon B.
Johnson warned that the Soviets would use Sputnik to impose “tyranny… [with] control [of]
the Earth’s water, to cause drought and flood…. to divert the Gulf Stream and change
temperatures to frigid!” Some scientists were even more extreme, with one claiming the
Soviets could create a lunar base from which to attack America. Other influential officials
like Henry Kissinger feared that the Soviets would reduce the United States to “Fortress
America in a world in which we had become largely irrelevant.” 40 Manhattan Project
scientist George Price went as far to say “by no later than 1975, America will be [a puppet

“They’ll know you’ve arrived when you drive up in an Edsel” The Advertisement Archives
– Ad# 21056702. 1950s Collection.
38 Sherry, Shadow of War, 214.
39 Bonsall, Disaster in Dearborn, 143.
40 Sherry, Shadow of War, 214.
37
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state] of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics!”41 Even Frank Sinatra in Ford’s Edsel Show
joked that Bob Hope would be “the first man to entertain the troops in space.”42 Of course
these claims were hyperbolic, but this onslaught from influential Americans made the fears
appear all too real to the public.
The national media would only pour gasoline on this already raging fire. Magazines
like Life proclaimed that Sputnik was the new “Lexington and Concord,” and Americans
“need to respond as the Minutemen did.” Others compared Sputnik’s importance to “the
discovery of America by Columbus.”43 A New York Times cartoon showed Sputnik satellites
patrolling the sky of a world in chains, calling the Russian threat as serious as Hitler’s
Luftwaffe was to Britain.44 In fact the Times shared Henry Kissinger’s fear that the Soviets
could use Sputnik as proof to the world that they were “the strongest military and scientific
power.”45 Worst of all, some questioned if it was even possible for “a loose Democracy [to]
compete with a… dictatorship.”46 With this much panic over the future of the United States,
Ford’s message of a bright American future fell on deaf ears.
Similarly, Sputnik created massive issues for Ford’s claim that the Edsel was a car so
stylish others should jealously compliment “the owner’s style and good taste.”47 In this new
United States, the Edsel’s styling symbolized all that was keeping America behind the
Soviets. Edsel ad’s often emphasized the Edsel’s “most beautiful” styling in the face of the
”humdrum” “lookalike cars” that dominated American roads. The most common Edsel print
Zieger, Evolving Cold War, 10.
42 “The Edsel Show.”
43 Divine, Sputnik Challenge, xiv-xvi.
44 “How the World reacted to Sputniks,” New York Times, November 10, 1957, AI.
45 Harry Schwartz, “Soviet Exploits its New Sputnik Diplomacy,” New York Times, October
10, 1957, A2.
46 Zieger, Evolving Cold War, 16.
47 Bonsall, Disaster in Dearborn, 110.
41
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ad was the “Dramatic Edsel Styling Leads the Way” campaign, which showcased the cars
flashy and “elegant” look. Magazine readers saw images of Edsels driving by the ocean, in
New York City, and highways across America; everywhere it went Ford claimed “your Edsel
is watched eagerly” by envious drivers. After all, the car was crafted with “you [sic] ideas,”
not by some out of touch executive. 48 Even Frank Sinatra praised the Edsel for being “a nice
car” during CBS’s The Edsel Show.49
However by 1957, Sputnik and changing consumer appetites made excess feel
frivolous. As automobile historian John Rae describes, “somewhere between the planning
and the unveiling of the Edsel public preference turned away from the big, ornate cars that
had dominated” the decade. The shock of the Sputnik launch renewed the urgency of
America’s fight against communism, making Americans view excess as a distraction from
this fight. Even before Sputnik, Americans were growing tired of gigantic and gaudy cars
that needed “new and bigger garage[s] to house.”50 Yet the Edsel ads were proof that
Detroit was not listening. Since 1954, public polls showed Americans enjoyed simple
ornaments and grilles on their cars, and industry magazines like Motor Trend began to
complain that only “stylists” made American cars instead of “engineers and drivers.” 51 The
Edsel’s negative reviews would only intensify this national disappointment in American
cars, since almost all criticized its look. Motor Trend felt it was not as revolutionary as “all
the fanfare of the past two years” suggested; Consumer Reports found it ugly; and of course
“Dramatic Edsel Styling leads the Way,” The Advertisement Archives – Ad# 21056702,
1950s Collection.
49 “The Edsel Show,” last modified March 11, 2009,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ze0Az9tdk875.
50 Rae, American Automobile, 206-211.
51 Floyd Clymer “Report to Detroit: A nationwide survey on what car owners want,” Popular
Mechanics, February, 1954, 2.
48
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Time magazine would infamously say it looked like “an Oldsmobile sucking a lemon.” Three
years later, companies like American Motors would answer these complaints, as they sold
the public “common sense, socially responsible… [compact cars instead of Detroit’s] gashog dinosaurs.” However in 1957, consumers did not have this option and the frustration
brewed.52
The Sputnik threat also intensified problems with the Edsel’s “dramatic styling.”53
Suddenly Americans saw it as frivolous, as it fed into a narrative that America was in a
Roman Empire-esque fall into decadence and excess. Just as the “Visigoths sacked” a
distracted Rome, there was a growing sense that Americans “blessed with… [luxury could
not compete] with the disciplined Red masses.” Americans did not want to sacrifice for the
“free world’s” survival; instead these “selfish and feckless citizens” only cared about “the
height of the tail fin in the new car” or, as Life magazine lamented, “who wins the World
Series.”54 Even President Eisenhower criticized the public for letting “opulence [dull] the
spirit.” In fact Gallup polls showed 50% showed “no particular alarm” at Sputnik, and
another revealed four million Americans had not even heard of it. Life stood in horror as
some in the “complacent majority” ignored Sputnik and wanted to “let others worry about”
it.55 A frightened American media also aimed their sights at the youth, since American
schools were filled with “stupid children” far too focused on “clubs [and] school
newspapers.”56 Ultimately the American economy seemingly became its “glory and its
Bonsall, Disaster in Dearborn, 144-197.
“Dramatic Edsel Styling leads the Way,” The Advertisement Archives – Ad# 21056702,
1950s Collection.
54 Sherry, Shadow of War, 216.
55 Zieger, Evolving Cold War, 12-22.
56 Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 52-53.
Sherry, Shadow of War, 239.
52
53
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nemesis,” and to Ford’s horror the frivolous Edsel was increasingly a symbol of the
nemesis.57
Furthermore, Sputnik and the Edsel’s widespread technological failures ate away at
Ford’s claim that it was a “smart car.”58 Again, Ford truly believed they had created the car
of the future, and they were ready to prove it by glorifying the car’s technology. The Edsel’s
“advanced features” were the centerpiece of many ads, a perfect example being its
advertisements in the New York Times. Ford boasted that their new “Teletouch
Transmission… [would] put shifting in its place,” as drivers could “shift without lifting a
hand from the wheel.” Now Teletouch “does the work for you- smoothly, surely…
electrically.” No longer did brakes need “periodic tightening”; now the Edsel had “selfadjusting breaks.”59 During the primetime television special The Edsel Show, Ford
showcased the Edsel’s sparkling and powerful V-8 engine, claiming it “outperforms any
medium-priced car you’ve ever driven.”60
However the Edsel’s widespread technological problems destroyed this message,
playing into a narrative that America was falling behind in science and technology. Part of
this simply was bad luck for Ford, as labor strikes struck right when production needed to
start for E-Day. When manufacturers were finally able to get back to work, Edsel’s “were
churned out as quickly as possible” and “quality suffered.” Ultimately Edsel’s did not have
the most “advanced features” as Ford claimed; instead they were made with rushed parts
assembled at the “last-minute.” All too often owners had “absolutely dreadful experiences”
with their Edsel, and the bad news spread through “word of mouth advertising.” Amazingly,
Zeiger, Evolving Cold War, 19.
58 Bonsall, Disaster in Dearborn, 110.
59 New York Times, September 15, 1957.
60 “The Edsel Show.”
57

15

Ford accidently sent a car meant for the general public to Motor Trend instead of their
meticulously prepared test car, and just like the others it was full of issues. Readers of the
most influential magazine in the industry heard the truth, as the Motor Trend car’s
“windshield leaked” and “transmission motor burnt out.”61 As the stories continued to
worsen, people began to joke that Edsel stood for “Every Day Something Else Leaks.”62
Yet the Edsel was not the only technological embarrassment lining the headlines,
since Sputnik unleashed a wave of fears over American science that only made Ford’s
issues worse. Key advisors to President Eisenhower warned “the Russians were
emphasizing science more heavily in their schools… Unless the United States speeded up
their scientific programs, within ten years the Russians would be ahead.” While President
Eisenhower still believed America eventually would win a prolonged Cold War, the national
media and a frightened public were swept into a frenzy over it. Eisenhower’s assurances
that the Russians only educated a “talented elite” and that most were “spurned” fell on deaf
ears, as the media ripped the educational system to shreds. Life blasted American schools
for giving “milk shake slurping, slack jawed” “stupid children… better care than the bright”
who only “found boredom” in American schools.63 Senators like Lyndon Johnson asserted
that the Russians had “twice as many math and science teachers.” Even after Eisenhower
increased education funding, critics still demanded “a much larger number.”64

Bonsall, Disaster in Dearborn, 198.
62 Matt Haig, Brand Failures: The Truth About the 100 Biggest Branding Mistakes of All Time.
(London: Kogan Page, 2011.) 20.
61

Sherry, Shadow of War, 228.
Zieger, Evolving Cold War, 12.
64 Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 13-54.
63
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Instead of a triumphant message to the world that America was firmly in control,
America’s first satellite only fed fuel to the fire. The American’s Vanguard I had been in
development long before the Sputnik launch, and the American public was already angry
over broken promises that it would be “the first in space.” Yet when it was finally finished it
was an absolute embarrassment. The greatest country on Earth could only muster a
satellite that was a third of the size of Sputnik II, and a fuel leak left it unable to even leave
the launchpad.65 Once again a fallible America became the butt of jokes that dominated
newspaper headlines across the globe, with the New York Times listing headlines such as
“Kaputnik…Stay-Putnik…Flopnik… [and] Puffnick.”66 While America would eventually get
an “Uncle Samnik” into orbit in 1958, Sputnik’s damage to American prestige still left ugly
scars.67 Unfortunately for Ford, the Edsel was just another example of America’s failures in
technology.
At the same time that Edsel advertisements failed to attract American consumers,
internal struggles ravaged Ford and marked the beginning of the end for the Edsel. In fact
historians such as Thomas E. Bonsall and Tom Dicke often cite this infighting as the central
reason for the Edsel’s failure, arguing that it prevented Ford from salvaging the faltering
brand. After all, Mercury had “almost identical… market segment penetration” to the Edsel
when it was launched in 1939, and Ford was able to salvage that into a moderately
successful brand.68 Why not the Edsel?
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In contrast to Mercury, Robert McNamara’s whiz kids saw the Edsel as a financial
black hole that needed to end, sending them into a bitter fight with the Edsel division.
McNamara had always been a critic of the Edsel experiment and favored the base-line Ford,
and the dark storm surrounding the car’s launch only empowered him. After McNamara
fired many Edsel supporters, by 1958 the whiz kids began to take the upper hand and shift
the Edsel out. Suddenly the “Lincoln and Mercury [divisions] were collapsed into” one,
which sliced their funding and hurt their halo effect for the Edsel. If Ford was unwilling “to
commit the resources necessary” to establish Lincoln and Mercury as their own divisions,
Dicke argues “any compelling reason to keep the Edsel division… or even…[the] line” alive
was destroyed. With Ford Motor Company switching their focus back to the baseline Ford
and horrible headlines dominating the press, it became much easier for McNamara to plan
to eventually kill the Edsel and have the Mercury brand as the sole medium-priced
offering.69
In the years following 1957, Ford launched new Edsel division cars twice. Yet each
time, the Edsel received less and less funding and looked less and less unique. While Ford
“publically [supported] the Edsel,” behind close doors Ford had already made “plans to
ease it out the market.” By 1960, everything that made an Edsel an Edsel was stripped from
the car, as its signature vertical grille vanished. Some at Ford such as CEO Henry Ford II
fought to save the Edsel, as he urged frightened Edsel dealers not to abandon Ford.
However by 1960, the Edsel’s problems proved to be insurmountable. On November 19,
1960 Ford announced to the public that the Edsel division was no more. Ultimately the
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Edsel only sold 110,000 cars, and sales had been in a downward spiral for the past two
years.70
Ironically, Nixon was right when he joked that the communists were egging “the car,
not me.”71 However it was for all the wrong reasons, as the Edsel played into fears that
America was slipping behind the Soviet Union. Ultimately Ford’s emphasis on excess,
advanced technology, and the American Dream fell on deaf ears. Instead the very product
the advertisers were selling was proof that all three were in jeopardy. As the Wall Street
Journal stated, “the consumer is a dictator without peer.” They wielded that power
violently when they axed Ford’s dream car, proving the Edsel’s heralded “you [sic] ideas”
never truly existed.72 The car of the future was another flopnik, and no amount of
advertising ingenuity could save it.
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